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Outline of Argument.
1. Introduction.
Statement of the Issue.
Our problem is the apparent antinomy between
causality as the universal law of nature, and freedom
of the will, as the basis of ethical life.
Statement of the Solution.
The contradiction is due to a misconception of the
true implication of the terms causation and freedom;
and to the narrowness of our metaphysics, or our in-
terpretation of life as a whole, and since we holu
*
that both causation and freedom are possible, and
would cease to be contradictions in a completely
known universe, a solution of the antinomy if offered.
2
.
Argument proper.
The desired reconciliation can only come, when we prove
A. The validity of Final Causes.
E. Establish the Sanction of Ethical Principles.
A. Review of Final Causes to establish their validity.
a. Definition of Final Cause. Distinguished from
Material Cause
Formal Cause
Efficient Cause
b. Only two methods of explaining the facts of the
universe, either by efficient or final causation.
c. Explanation by efficient causation.
.). W '
.
- \ : o • • >
jo k n ) v id; r ; -.'!>% 0-'. s
t
..
•
,
i
.
<r: ,
: J >t '.D • Otf ./jj * , : v
-
'
-
• L
,
-i r •
.
• j 3; : • ~ *o •' rJ
,
•,
.
. 3
,
»
•
.*• :
'
; >n -
Oj f • i c
•
-
•
•
•’
*•
-
affr ; • ‘T
j
:1> o. <? j'2
,
. 3 ,q rjcq .
‘
•:
.
.
' ;
l ' /
.
•
.
•
. j.* ;>i: sTv .. ... i
: e
1
^
-
V, -
, ..
•
-i l J
'
. !
•
„
7
. r: . iii ; . c : x
'
• i - •
All explanations by efficient causation can
be reduced to explanation by
a. Mechanism,
b. Instinct,
c. Evolution.
All three are shown to be insufficient in
themselves, at the most they only explain the mode
of the a.ction, not the cause. This compels us to
seek another source for tne facts of the cosmic world,
and the only other process that is acceptable to ra-
tional thinking men is- an explanation by intelligence,
s.nd the only one about which they can form any clear
idea. This brings us to the subject cf Final Causes,
d. Explanation by Final Causation.
r
(1) Cannot be established apriori.
Futility of the teleological argument;
if there are no ends in the universe,
there are none for man any more than
for nature.
(2) It is an hypothesis, the truth of which rests
on the number and the character of the pheno-
mena observed.
(3) It is necessitated by the fact that causality
merely as an efficient cause, cannot explain the
fact of organs, genera, or species, nor the ra-
%
tional nature of man.
(4) Truth rests upon the following arguments:
(a) Argument from design.
Character of design.
Adaptation to the future.
(b) Confirmatory physical arguments.
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(c) Confirmatory moral arguments.
(d) Argument from history.
e. Finality if admitted, must be rightly understood to
he one of intelligence. Uniform sequence of pheno-
mena never explains the cause of the sequence. The
cause must rest in sometning having being. This
brings us to a theistic conception of the universe.
It obliges us to posit as a world-ground, a being
that is intelligent because designing; moral because
likewise imposing moral dicta.tes upon the reason.
The finality must rest in a moral universe, and the
lower steps are the ones by which nature rises to its
t ermi nu s
.
B. Examination of Ethical Principles to find their sanction,
a.. Existence of the law of duty.
It is not difficult to show that in the actual
state of human consciousness that an elemental
«
>
factor called duty exists.
b. Origin of the Law.
Three explanations are offered.
(a) An acquired idea born of civilization.
Argued; that there is no morality among
savages; that the codes among civilized
nations are contradictory.
Proved to be false since it fails
to explain the necessity of its
continued existence at the present
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day. Moreover an historical argu-
ment Coes not impugn the validity
of the icea as now held. The idea,
of a general form for the existing
law claims control over the reason,
and over the will.
(b) It is the result of reason working upon some
sort of intellectual data.
(c) It is implanted in us by some causative power
outside of ourselves.
These last two explanations point to a
lav; giver, to whom we are personally
responsible
.
c. Nature of the Law.
(a) Absolute. The same ideal or model of perfec-
tion is given to all men.
(b) Universal. Gives the same commands to all
men under the same circumstances.
d. Sanction of the Law.
(a) Lies in the soul. It is an ideal that is
unfolded by slow stages of growth. The
natural in man must be raised to the plain
of the moral. The law derives its sanction,
not because it is imposed from without, but
because it appeals to the raason, and we in-
evitably desire it ourselves. The reason
sanctions it because it accords with its nature.
(b) Part played by Human Freedom.
Its limitation and its scope.
It is limited by
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(1) External factors.
Environment
(2) Internal factors.
Temperament ) inherited
nature ) from the
Disposition ) past
These two factors constitute the sphere
I in which man works out his ic.es 1.
C. Apparent conflict between ethical principles and Final
Cause s
.
Source of the conflict.
Due to an effort to reconcile efficient causa-
tion with free will. If we reta.in the explana-
tion of the world process by
Mechanism
Instinct
Evolution
no ha.rmo ny con be attained.
Due to failure to reconcile the two on Humian,
empirical, or psychological grounds. Fallacy of
Kant’s transcendental idealism shown because it
substitutes new difficulties for the old. Reasons
^ by which modern science contends against free
will discussed and refuted.
D. Reconciliation of Ethical principles ana Final Causes.
^
a. Reconciliation can come only when freedom is
rightly understood, and when finality does not
mean predeterminism of the will,
b. To what extent the theory of final causes
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determines and limits the nature of the
ind ividual
.
Limits him in the sense that he is
part of the cosmic process, and com-
pelled to work out his destiny.
c. Limitation of the meaning of freedom: it
cannot mean freedom in any unconditioned
sense of the word; it cannot mean chance,
or caprice, or power to act without motive,
or plan, or without calculation.
d. The reconciliation can come only when we re-
cognize that the will is determined in the
sense that it has uniform antecedents. It is
free, in the sense that it is not determined
by anything outside of itself. Freedom is not
exemption from law, it can be realized only
where there is law and order. The fact that
it is an ethical principle shows that it does
not lie in the field of lawlessness.
e. The solution depends then not only on man's
relation to nature, but also on his relation
to the infinite,-- both interpretations throw
us back once more on the essential and the ulti-
mate nature of the man himself.
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1 f. It is the union of the Universal Will with that of
the individual that can bring aoout the uesired har-
mony. It is this union that constitutes morality.
| g. This reconciliation is possible only where the
theory of Final Causes has been accepted, and where
freedom in the sense defined above is recognized.
3. Conclusion.
The reconciliation can take place only when we re-
view the life of man in its totality. Cur meta-
physics must correct the idea of the libertarian who
makes freedom all, and the necessitarian who makes
automatism all. In a completely known universe, the
two facts are only the reverse and the obverse of the
two-faced fact of a rational self-development. Free-
dom is the only means by which man can work out his
destiny in a predestined world, of sentient beings.
In tne joint action, in the life of every mind
^ directed by a freedom that recognizes an Ideal, and
is thus necessitated to realize it, we find the union.
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The Ethical Aspect of Final Causes
.
To the student of Philosophy the problem is not new,
but its interest is still vital, for all the charges brought
by modern science against Philosopny, none have oeen more
strange or prolific of fruitless controversy, than the at-
tacks directed against human freedom.
The problem may be stated thus: Life as we know it
presents two great orders of things, one the world of ob-
jective facts, the Cosmos, the other the world of subjec-
tive values, the moral world. In the cosmic world, which
we interpret by scientific methods, we find that the law
of causality reigns supreme. In the moral world, which we
interpret by standards that we supply ourselves, we find
that freedom of the will is the absolute condition and pos-
tulate, the criterion of all life that has any ethical
value. Herein lies an apparent antinomy: either the law
of causality is universal and without exception, in which
case freedom of the will is a delusion, or in the moral
world, the law suffers a notable exception.
The interests of science seem bound up with the denial
of freedom in any and every sense of the word. Scientists
claim that the admission means embarrassment to the scien-
tific consciousness, and the surrender of the claim to
finality in its view of human life.
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This attitude has led many philosophers to assert that we
are lawlessly free, and able to initiate our actions with-
out motive or cause. We are all familiar with the fable
of the two knights that quarrelled about the self-same
shield, because each of them saw one side of it alone.
The disputants of determinism versus freedom are in much
the same position, and most of the arguments set forth on
either side can be reduced to a war of meaningless words
of great sound and fury, signifying nothing. A general
truth might be stated here, “all nature demands a broader
and truer interpretat ion wherein every part shall have as-
signed to it its just significance, and unto the whole,
adequate import be ascribed."
The source of tne conflict is due to a mi sconception
of the true implication of the terms causation a.nd freedom,
and to the narrowness of our metaphysics, or our interpre-
tation of life as a whole. To the author, causality and
freedom are both true, and in a completely known universe
would cease to be contradict ions
,
and since a thorough going
system of philosophy demands the justification of both prin-
ciples and their reconciliat ion, I venture once more to offer
a solution to this already much debated question.
In all philosophical discussions, it is absolutely ne-
cessary. that all terms employed should be so defined that
there can be no ambiguity in their interpretat ion. So much
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depends in any reconciling project such as is here at-
tempted in getting at the true meaning of causation, cn
the one hand, and freedom on the other. Therefore con-
siderable space must be devoted to a thorough review of
causation, to establish the validity of final causes, and
to an examination pf ethical principles, to find their
sanction. Then, and only then, can we effect the desired
reconciliation.
The first point then in our discussion is to review
briefly the proofs for finality in causation. In all sys-
tems of philosophy, the term cause has four meanings;
1
,
The material cause; the "raw stuff" so to speak, or
contents, out of which reality is formed.
2
.
The formal cause; the principle of discrimination and
arrangement, by which the material is kept from being
chaotic, and instead is rendered intelligible.
3_. The kinetic or changing, or efficient cause; by which
form is applied to matter, and one form is changed to
another.
4 The final cause; the cause wherefore the intelligible
and recognized aim under v/hich all the first three
operate
.
The following example may make this distinction
clearer. We wish to model a bust in clay. First of all
there is the clay; obviously there can be no clay figure
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if there i s no clay. This then is the material cause of
the finished figure. But this same figure is as impor-
tant a condition of the "bust as the clay. The figure pro-
duced in the clay is called the formal cause. Just as
necessary to the being of the effect is the artist v/ho
does the modelling, the active or efficient cause of the
bust; and lastly there is his purpose. This end or pur-
pose which prompted the efficient cause to act is known
as the Final Cause.
To the philosopher, only the last two are of interest,
since men try to expls.in the facts of the cosmos either
by efficient or by final causation. All theories of effi-
cient causation can be reduced to an explanation of the
forces of nature oy mechanism, instinct, or evolution.
The form of the argument has varied from age to age, but
the almost uninterrupted aim of philosophy has been the
aiscovery of efficient causes in nature. In early times,
men saw the cause of all things in fire, or water, or air,
or fortuitous impact, or combination of material atoms.
To them the sovereign shaping element was the only Cod.
Again, Comte’s metaphysical era was characterized by the
belief in efficient causes, end the attempt to discover ana
define them. Briefly, then, what are these theories and
wherein do they fall short?
The mechanical theory announces that everything that
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is, or has happened, exists because something outside made
it he so, or happen so, and that there is no such thing
as self-activity. Whatever appears to he self-activity
and the originations of new chains of causality is only,
after all, a link in the great chain of correlation of
forces which has no beginning and no ending. Science has
taken for its problem the discovery of the simple mechani-
cal elements that masquerade under the forms of life, the
plant and animal, and under the widely variant and complex
forms of human life. Mechanism explains away the second
order of causality, which we find in all our experiences
hy thinking it into the forms of simple mechanism of dead
elements, moved only hy impact from outside. The diffi-
culty lies in the fact that mechanism itself must he
accounted for. As far as it suffices, we are all right;
if it sufficed everywhere we should not need to seek
another explanation. But, as Janet remarks, "however
great a part he assigned to it, there always comes a mo-
ment when it runs aground and breaks down, were it only,
for example, before the final causes in man. It is then,
hy way of regression, the territory in appearance aban-
doned, can he token little hy little, end we can ascend
from, psychological finality to physiological a.nd organic
finality." Coining of new terms explains nothing.
Magnetism, electricity, the electron theory, are names
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for our ignorance, not for knowledge-fence-words set up
at the outposts of the ground that has been surveyed, and
designating unexplored regions beyond. We can never know
absolutely the truth of a single law of the inductive sci-
ences. "Because the physicists have persisted in talking
about causation when, according to their own admission, they
meant only invariable antecedence; and of force, power, and
energy, when they meant only the motion, either actual or
foreseen, they have been betrayed, in the expression of
their doctrines into statements which are inconsistent with
each other, illogical and even meaningless; when they at-
tempt to dovetail these facts into systems and theories, to
build a philosophy of nature upon them, to give us a new
cosmogony, and a new conception of man, the universe and
God -- or rather of man and the universe without a. God--
then they have gone beyond their proper functions, and their
use of a phraseology which does not belong to them, has be-
trayed them into countless incon si stencies and absurdities."
The mechanical hypothesis fully carried out leads to a viols,
tion of all the laws of science, since it makes an absolute
hiatus between the phenomena of nature and the intelligence
of man; to a violation of all the laws of reasoning, by deny
ing intelligence in any form; to a contradiction, because,
it is forcibly arrested in the presence of a lest ca.se, the
human intelligence, a.nd consequently it is constrained, at
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least to admit finality, which suffices for its demonstration.
Instinct and evolution remain. Instinct of ’itself
never explains. It is a mysterious faculty and calls for
an explanation. Evolution to some extent as a scientific
hypothesis is possible. But as it is popularly held, there
is little, if anything, in the way of fact or experiment or
experience to justify the enormous assumptions upon which it
rests. Even in its most strictly scientific form, it leaves
very much to be desired; nor does it rise above the dignity
of being an hypothesis. In any case, granting the claim to
the fullest extent, it is not sufficient in itself as an ex-
planation. It may explain the mode of action not the cause.
Applied to organized forms, evolution may have two meanings.
Either it expresses the gradation of organic beings, rising
by degrees from less to more perfect forms, which it must
seek the cause outside of itself, or it is only a theory
of fortuitous combinations under a more learned form. A
single step in the series is not accounted for by referring
it to the preceding step, however familiar the sequence may
have been. Many people seem to imagine that, if the suc-
cessive steps are very short ones, -- or placed very near
each other,- a, bridge is thereby formed on which we may pass
without difficulty form one extreme to the other, either
from the structureless germ up to the complex and perfect
organism, or from the animalcule up to man. The whole theory
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of the evolutionists is founded upon this delusion. The
)f difficulty lies in taking any step at all. Even if a
chain of "being were to "be established from the lowest Monad
up to the intellect of an archangel, the successive steps
^ sliding into each other by imperceptible gradations, we
should not diminish one whit, the necessity for seeking out-
side of the series for a First Cause of all things. With-
out the agency of mind which cannot be found in a chain of
mere physical events, or self-acting machines, however near
they may be to each other, the first step of evolution, the
least movement of change, becomes impossible.
Thus Evolution does not give us, in the end, one reason
more than any other mechanical system for the facts of the
universe. It does not explain how from a primitive chaos
a regular system should have emerged. Its ideal would be
to reduce all tc the laws of motion, but as we have seen
neither motion or matter can explain anything. Matter
seems to be enfolded in mystery. Motion is as mysterious
^
in its nature. Matter endowed with motion presents innu-
merable problems to the scientist and the philosopher.
Each and both together require an explanation of their
possibility. In neither of these two elements is con-
^ tained the principle of a rational development. We see
then the absolute need of some other idea which will serve
ive
for direct
A
cause , -- this then brings us to the doctrine of
finality in nature.
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The only other explanation that can he offered to ex-
plain the facts of the visible universe, and about which we
can form a clear idea, is by intelligence . Our process must
be one of exclusion. In man, we recognize a mode of calcu-
lation superior to foresight, namely inspiration, not in-
stinct, since instinct is routine, while inspiration is
creative. The question remains, wherein is the explanation
of the cosmic process more satisfactory, by intelligence?
As Janet remarks so concisely, the principle of final
causes is not a self-evident principle. We reach it only
by induction, and accept it as it verifies the number and
character of the observed phenomena. We find that the
mechanism does not suffice to explain the facts or organ-
isms, genera, and species-. It is reached by the fact, that
certain combinations with a final phenomena independent of
them, would be a mere chance, and that nature cannot be ex-
plained altogether by accident. The relation of finality
being once admitted as a law of the universe, the only
rational hypothesis is that is is derived from an intelli-
gent Cause. We must show the harmony and arrangement of
nature, we must point out that there is an adaptation of
the parts to the whole, and how even the lav/s and principle
that direct the moral and intellectual judgment of man,
demonstrate the existence of a designing cause directing
all things to their proper ends.
%
<
• r.
>
'
:
.
-
.
.
:
-
»-
f
,
,
(
J
,
Dr, - [ or
<
* <
‘
•
<
< t
: ( t
<r. .
n r<r> : > ; in <
«
,
r :
.
OP
When we consider the universe as a whole we are
struck by the harmony and balance manifested in it. The
courses of the planets, and the laws of motion to which
they are subjected act as if each had its purpose or end.
Again in the vital operations of plants and animals we
find a wonderful adaptation, a future purpose. The web
of the spider, the structure of the hive, the nest of the
swallow, show us not only is a very definite end to be at-
tained, but also that animals, incapable of perceiving and
understanding for themselves any finality in the universe,
and unable to investigate, choose, or vary the means at
their disposal, still work similarly towards the end
planned for them, and instinctively play their part in the
finality of the whole. If then we ask whence comes this
disposition seen in the whole of nature, whence and why
the observed laws, whence the plan upon which vegetable and
animal structures are built up, and to what purpose each
tends, regularfy and systematically toward the production
of its own proper effects?-- we must invariably answer that
there is a final cause for all this arranging, ordering,
disposing, and moving towards definite fixed and pre-
established ends. Each particular fruit, in its form,
color, fragrance, a definite outgrowth from the flov/er,
the bud, the leaves, the stem and branches, the trunk and
root of its tree, the entire development born of, and grow-
ing from, one tiny seed, itself produced from a parent plant,
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shows a far more wonderfully adapted purposiveness than
the most intricate and artificial machine. Still more as-
tounding is the finality manifested in the parts of ani-
mals and in their actions. Look where and when we will,
design is written large upon every being in nature; and,
with our knowledge of ourselves and the arbitrary nature
of our intellectual and moral first principles, our theo-
retical truths that are seen immediately and necessarily
,
and the practical dictates of our reason when contemplat ing
the performing or omitting of an action, we must perforce
conclude that there is indeed a designer, intellecutal --
because designing and imposing principles upon intellect;
moral -- because of the moral dictates likewise designed
and imposed; else we must confess to an utter chaos in the
•whole of nature, an utter incomprehensibility in all the
conceptions of our minds.
Finality not being a subjective view of our mind, but
a real law of nature, demands a real cause. That the final-
ity cannot be mechanism which is destructive of all final-
ity, nor that which is above mechanism, -- instinct or
vitality,-- we have proved. The primary root then must
be in soul -- that is intelligence or thought; for there
is nothing beyond, at least intelligible to us, except,
perhaps liberty. But liberty without intelligence and
thought is only brute force. In considering not only man
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but every moral being in general, as the end of creation,
we have a reason for being warranted to regard the world
as a system of final causes. The world has its end -
to become the theatre, the instrument, the object of
morality. In order to be appropriated to that end, it must
originally be susceptible of finality, the lower degrees must
be the steps whereby nature rises to its terminus. There
must be a succession of relative ends, to render possible
this absolute end. The end of nature is to realize in it-
self the absolute end as far as possible, or to render pos-
sible the realization of the absolute in the world. This
is brought to pass by morality. "If ihere are no ends in
the universe, there are none for man any more than for
nature; there is no reason why the series of causes should
oe mechanical up to the appearance of man, and become
teleological from man onwards. If mechanism reigns in
nature it reigns everywhere, in ethics as well as in physics.
No doubt there might still be subjective and contingent ends,
but not unconditional and absolute, not truly moral ends.
Morality is at once the accompli slime nt and the ultimate
proof of the law of finality."
By every road, by every comparison, we are led to
the identity of our conceptions. The necessary being, the
first unmoved and immovable motor, the first efficient
cause, the highest and pure perfection, the living
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intellect, the ultimate author of all design and finality,
are one and the same "being.
There is no principle of reason, no scrap of reason,
to contradict the belief in a Final Cause. Efficient
causality can never adduce a direct argument against it.
Hypothesis may take what form it please, an eternal and
forsaken bathybios, or a thunderstorm, or a dead ancestor,
or the forces of nature, but it is incapable of disproving
the existence of a Final Cause. The plain English of such
theories is this: -- "Anything you will, only no Creator.
But if there be no Creator, all these theories involve
self-causation. Ho germs, or planets, or Bathybios, can
save them from absurdity. Bathybios is either created,
self-created, or increate, that is eternal. Is it easier
to believe an eternal Bathybios than an Eternal Creator?
An eternal slime than an Eternal Intelligence?"
If we take the pains to look closely into our own
minds, we are immediately struck with the deeply rooted
sense of responsibility with regard to our own a.ctions,
which we find occupying so prominent a place there. And
if, to go al step further, we attempt to concord the expres-
sion of this feeling of responsibility, or duty, as it is-
sues in acts with the principle itself, if we seek to dis-
cover the relationship existing between its concrete appli-
cation and its abstract nature, we shall find that it is
neither the result of the education of a primitive instinct,
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nor an entirely irrational sentiment. Whatever may be the
origin of this feeling of duty, we must admit that, in the
actual consciousne ss of humanity or, at least in that of
the noblest groups of humanity, there exists the idea of a
general or universal form for our actions, of a law that
claims control over the reason, and command over the will.
If we examine this sense of duty as it exists solely
in ourselves as individuals, we shall see that it is noth-
ing more than an aspect of our reason, a purely subjective
feeling which we are conscious of possessing. It has its
value, and its force for each individual, inasmuch, and
just so far, as he personally apprehends it. But in some
form or other, every human being is conscious of its
possession. The universality of moral principles is not
argued against when we say that there is no morality among
savages, that among civilized nations we find contradic-
tory codes, for the fact remains that a moral conscious-
ness exists. Its effects in individual cases and among
different nations may be quite different. The Greeks
burned ihe bodies of their dead as the highest token of
filial devotion. The Callatians, on the other hand, con-
sidered cremation to be in the highest degree wrong. In
either case, the feeling was equally strong. The ‘'ought
of the Callatians was similar to that of the Greeks. And
hence, though each of us must apply to his actions the
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dictates of his own conscience, in precisely the same way
that he must settle his intellectual problems for himself,
in the fulness of his own .knowledge
,
the moral principle,
the "ought not" and the "ought", is common to all men. We
share in common with all mankind the sentiment of obliga-
tion, duty, responsibility.
The question now remains, whence does this feeling
come? There are three explanations offered, only two of
which have any value. The first supposes it to be pri-
marily an instinct akin to that of the brutes, educated
and rendered permanent and imperative, by an indefinite
series of actions performed either by the individual, or
by his ancestors. Such actions the theory goes on to ex-
plain, have brought with them consequences of pain, or of
pleasure: and the indefinite repetition of painful, or of
pleasurable sensations, has at length caused the individual
to look upon his actions as right or wrong in the precise
proportion in which they have, in his own case or in that
of a long line of forebears, been connected with consequences
which he desires to avoid or attain. But the real diffi-
culty, the explanation of its existence at the present day,
and why human actions should be followed by sensations of
pain or of pleasure, is still unanswered. Two other explana-
tions remain. Either it is the result of reason working
upon some sort of intellectual data, or else it is implanted
in us by a causative power other than ourselves. The solu-
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tion of both these alternatives points unhe sitat ingly to
the same original cause.
The very idea of duty, then points to something su-
perior to the individual -- something that is fixed and
defined, and not subject to change on the part of the in-
dividual. In the second place, the idea of duty appeals
only to tne will and. reason of man, and unless we confess
to an utter irrationality in human nature, this will and
reason are fundamentally the same in all men. Thus the
lav; of duty is universal in its appeal, and absolute in
its command. It derives its basis from the fact that,
"every being owes it to himself that he should attain the
highest degree of excellence and of perfection of which
his nature is capable." The element of perfection, or of
excellence, varies of course with differing races in the
scale of being, and the feeling is capable of development
as man increases in knowledge, and sympathy, ana love with
his fellows, and thus comes to a more perfect realization
of the true essence of humanity. But once his essence is
realized, a man cannot wish to be anything but a true man,
a complete man, and he is thus self-determined to seek it.
The superior will so far as it imposes authority on the
inferior will is called obligation. The sanction of the
moral life lies in the soul. The reason commands the in-
dividual to ooey the aivine will, that manifests itself to
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man under the torn of duty, and the reason commands, be-
cause the .law is in conformity with the dictates of the
soul. The natural in man must be raised to the moral.
The mind realizes the validity of the law, the reason sanc-
tions it, and the will is self-determined to obtain it.
The act is a personal one, -- we are citizens of a moral
world, not slaves, and as such are co-workers with God.
Yle cannot overrate the importance of obligation as men
have understood it, and it presupposes a responsibility
and human freedom. A freedom that is implied in every
conception of human life that rises above the lowest.
"This belief is essential to, and implied in all human
enjoyments which rise above those of the animals and the
1owe s t savages, in all the refinements of civilization, of
art, of literature, in all systems of law, in the achieve-
ments of conqueror and statesman, in the charm of poll shea
society, in wit and humor and romance, in our very likes
and dislikes, in our personal judgments of our fellows, in
our passions, our friendships, and our affections."
Take away this belief, and what is the result? All the
deeper, the more delicate, the more interesting elements
in life would be annihilated. 7,rith the banishment of the
elements of freedom, all zest or meaning would vanish from
human intercourse. The instinct of social order and the
instinct to satisfy appetite, -- these would survive, but
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the heart of life would be gone. Vice and virtue would
suffer a similar degra.dat ion, and would forlornly meet
each other on terms of stolid equality. The truth is,
that nothing that human beings do or are has any real
value for us, except on the latent supposition that it is
possible for them to be, or to do, something else, and
that thus what they do, or are, represents a vital act of
personal and spontaneous will, instead of being merely the
outcome of a. long train of causes which lose themselves
in the general evolution of the race. Apert from this
element, feeling and action would lose nearly every quality
for which men have hitherto valued them. Freedom then be-
comes the working basis of all life that is rational. It
furnishes man with an elevating and sustaining conviction
that the shaping of the grand outlines of his destiny lies
in his own hands. The doctrine of free will, which is ne-
cessarily the reverse of the doctrine of moral responsibi li ty
is essentia.l as a working hypothesis to all human civiliza-
tion, to all the elements that a.re regarded as most valuable
by bad men, and moderately good men, as well as by excellent
men. The drama of existence would lose all zest without it.
Just as responsibility of action implies freedom of
action, just as freedom implies re spons ibil i ty , so does
responsibility for action when associated with the moral
sense and sentiment imply the existence of some percipient
being, to whom as a critic and judge of our actions we are
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responsible, and whose moral preferences being coincident
with our own moral sentiments, give to the latter a per-
manent and objective value. Assumption of free will and
moral responsibility reach Goa. The belief in free will
provides us with a working hypo the si s on which the mind
cp^n construct a reasonable, civilized life, and other be-
liefs do not. The belief always appears in synthesis.
All actions are fundament ally good or bad only in refer-
ence to the free will from which they proceed. Yoral
good and moral evil are rooted in the will itself; so
much so, that, without the free exercise of his will, we
cannot and do not hold any individual responsible for his
actions, nor in such a case do we ever, strictly speaking,
say that he has committed a crime or a sin.
Our idea of freedom however, needs a thorough examina-
tion that its limitations may be clearly evident. Freedom
must lie where responsibility lies, that is in a man’s
character. His character, however, is determined by both
internal and external factors. The internal factors are
the temperament, the nature and the disposition which he
has inherited from the past. The external factors are due
to the env ironment in which he finds himself placed. These
constitute for him the sphere in which he is to work out
the alternative and the choice between good and evil. This
sphere must differ for each individual since no two men are
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ever placed in the exact same circumstances, or subject
to the same desires, or passions, yet in the view of the
universe as a whole, unless our nature is utterly irra-
tional e.nd contradictory, each individual in working out
his destiny must be self-necessitated to make that destiny
coincide with the whole. In other words, our desires as
well as our deeds are subject to the dictates of our con-
scious reason. And when we become conscious of an ideal aim
in the universe, we are no longer free to disobey the comrnano
to realize it. "I)uty ,,
,
says Kant, "is the necessity of
obedience to the law from respect to the law", and our
liberty consists in the fact that we learn to follow with
judgment, choosing the way and the means of sacrificing our
lower nature to the higher. Our liberty comes from the
strength which we are capable of exerting in resisting any-
thing that will lead us farther from what we ha.ve conceived
as the true ideal. The strength of our liberty varies e.s
we have seen with each individual; there are degrees of
liberty; it is not absolute and final, and our liberty like
our responsibility is obligatory for us, only in so far as
we know and realise it. The will which desires the true good
in life must always command the will which desires the ap-
parent goou.; and our sin lies in a time world in failing to
avail ourselves of the higher dictates of the reason. Liberty
is not the actual possession of reason, but it is the capacity
of acting in accordance with reason. As Janet remarks,
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" it is useless to adopt metaphysical hyperbole, claiming
i s
for ourselves an absolute liberty which
A
unmanage a Die for
us. Liberty exists for us in a. real world, and as such it
is the power of emancipating ourselves from the control of
our inclinations
,
thanks to the light of reason, and by the
aid of feeling."
We realize that in all the operations of the universe
there is observable a certain definite order or regularity.
No event stands by itself; each has its necessary antecedent
and its inevitable consequences . And this conception of
regularity, at first perceived in its most obvious manifesta-
tions, has gradually extended to all the operations of nature,
including even those in which man has become a part. It has
come to be clearly recognized that man cannot be regarded
as standing alone, or outside the -ordinary laws of nature.
He exists as part of the universe and only as a part of it,
and can no more act independent ly of it than any wheel in a
machine can act independent ly of the movement of the machine
as a whole. Every thought and every action of which he is
capable has its necessary antecedents to the world around
him. This conception once grasped, free will would seem at
first almost too absurd to discuss. Man will always act ac-
cording to the greatest pressure put upon him; if it is a
number of forces he will go in the way of the resultant.
Taking this standpoint from the operations around him, the
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scientist proceeds therefrom to build up a complete scheme
for the universe, including even man humself. The liber-
tarian has been right in the insistence, however, that
there is a distinctive characteristic of human conduct as
compared with the mechanism of brute life. He has been
right in his conviction that conscious decision involves
a new element not contained in the antecedent s . He has usu-
ally been wrong in the conceptions by which he has tried to
interpret these convictions.
Our task then, is to heal this apparent conflict be-
tween the natural and the moral world, or the deep seated
antithesis between the interests of the scientific or in-
tellectual consciousne ss on the one hand
,
and the moral
and religious convictions of mankind on the other. That
such a disagreement exists has been recognized and treated
by different ages in various ways. As we pointed out in
the beginning, the difficulty is largely due to the system
of Metaphysics as a whole. The denial of freedom is the
necessary corollary of a pantheistic system such as
Spinoza’s. Again, in a system of materialism alloyed with
idealistic and evolutionary views, a theory of human voli-
tion is deduced which gives the death blow to free will.
The antecedent is in part the character of tne agent, in
part the motive rendering the action desirable. The char-
acter consists in dispositions and propensities intrinsic
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to the agent’s organism, ana is either inherited from an-
cestors or formed by past actions. The motives arise from
the pleasurableness or the unpleasurablene ss of the action
and its object, or from influence exercised by environment.
Character and motives determine the will with and inevi-
table necessity.
.Again, freedom cannot be vindicated in the empirical,
Humian, or psychological account of the universe. Kant
thought that he saw tne solution of the problem in his
theory of transcendental idealism. According to him, free-
dom lay outside the lav/s of the phenomenal world. The pro-
fundity and originality of his theory are incontestable,
but the fact remains that it only eliminates the diffi-
culties of other systems by substituting new ones, and that
it leaves the problem in the same state in which it was
found. Huxley tried to reach it indirectly, he at least
saw tne necessity of seeking a solution. "The development
of science meant the extension of the principle of causa-
tion and the consequent banishment from our kinds of the
very idea of free will. He admitted that had we really to
accept the dominion of causation as universal -- that there
would be no escape for us from an utter materialism and
nece ssariani sm which would drown the soul, paralize the
energies, debase the moral nature, and destroy the beauty of
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The main grounds upon which modern science contends
a.gainst free will are based first, on a subjective psy-
chology, or study of the mind’s action as revealed to us
by conscious experience; and from an objective study of
the human or physical organism. They claim that every act
of the will has its condition in the brain, therefore the
mental must follow the same laws tha.t prevail throughout
the whole physical universe. As regards organism, since it
is determined by parentage, health, climate, and similar
circumstances, and since organism determines the character
and the will of the individual, it is merely a multitude
of external causes that determine the will. The point
to remember here is that there is a well marked limit to
all psychological explanations. "The life of man, which
is in its essence a personal life is regarded by psychol-
ogy as an impersonal stream of thought, a. series of
phenomenal facts, a series of the mental states of con-
sciousness." But metaphysics must correct the abstract-
ness of all psychology, and review the moral life from
its personal centre, from that standpoint of the selfhood,
which, as a unifying principle is not to be phenomenal ised
because without its constant operation there would be no
phenomenal process at all; which cannot itself be accounted
for, or explained by psychology, because it is presup-
posed in any ethical view of life, any personal view.
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Since, however we have rejected all systems of
causation based upon materialism, evolution, or instinct,
we have no need here to reconcile these theories with
freedom. We grant that the harmony cannot be attained
unless we accept the theory of final causes, and freedom
as defined above. Then, and only then, can we effect the
desired harmony that follows easily and naturally from,
their genuine ideas; and show that this harmony is in-
volved in their necessa.ry and complement a.ry relation to
each other, a.nd that finally, out of the joint action,
there arises a universe evermore freely moving to a high-
er and higher union with God.
Any settlement of the question must recognize as true
the points which follow:
1. The reconciliation can come only when freedom is
rightly understood. It cannot mean freedom in any
unconditional sense, existing so to speak in vacuo.
It cannot mean caprice, or chance, or power to act
without influence, or plan, or purpose, or without
calculation. A freedom that is simply a "first
cause", an underived, unreasonable power is meaningles
2. Fo reconciliat ion is possible if the terms are so
juggled that they lose their original mea.ning yet
retain their names, as when we say that freedom means
spontaneity, instead of choice or alternative.
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3- ITo reconciliat ion can be reached if we take finality
in the world-ground to mean Predestination of the will.
4. The reconciliation can come only when we recognize that
the will is determined, in the sense that it has uniform
antecedents; that it is free, in the sense that it is
not determined by anything outside of itself. Free-
dom is not exemption from law: it can be realized only
where there is law and order. The fact that it is an
ethical principle shows us that it does not lie in the
fields of lawlessness.
5. The solution depends, then, not only on man’s relation
to nature, but also on his rela.tion to the infinite,--
both interpretat ions throw us back once more on the
essential and the ultimate nature of man himself. It
is the union of the universal Will with that of the
individual that can bring about the desired harmony,
and it is this union that constitutes morality.
We see the law of nature working as it were first
blindly and mechanically, through the medium of dead
matter; then, less blindly and mechanically, but none
the less surely, through animate matter; anu finally
end consciously and indirectly, but none the less
surely, through the medium of intelligence . Each in-
dividual has within himself the power of determining
the force of the various pressures brought to bear upon
him, so conditioning their control. The laws of the
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universe 7/ork, in the case of man, through free will, as
the medium through which tney alone can work in a sentient
world. Freedom is man, then, is simply the mode which has
been given to him to aid in the finality of the whole. This
natural world is a scene of ceaseless conflict between its
immediate or present form, and the eternal or ideal form of
the spirit. The universe is gradually working out its
destiny. Instinct, evolution, free will, merely explain
the process by which various orders in the scale of being
work. But the imperative and constraining definiteness of
physical fate implies somewhere an ultimate refining source,
itself therefore free from which the constraining edict is-
sues, This source, as free and yet defining, must be self-
defined, must be Itself. The only hypothesis that ex-
plains the totality of phenomena, which grasps the harmony
between the moral and the physical worlds, is that there is
an Absolute First Cause, that is uncondi t ioned by anything
outside itself.
We recognize tha.t freedom is not a question of yes
end no, but rather of how far and how much. To say that
there is no control of nature by science, is palpably absurd;
to say that all progress 'is due to natural selection of ac-
cidental variations, is becoming less and less plausible,
with the conscious organization of industrial, social and
political agencies. There is an automatic, as well as a
<
i
t - I
L H'^O . •
,
.
.!'V j i
. J
» JCi-c
.
;
'
< t ,
. ...
'
; y - ,N i < ' > a: ' . • '
.
(
,
.
\
,
.
,
) W'J ...
,
.
v . ;< :
-
-a'- *
. ;
•.
'
-- 28--
vcluntary, element in human activity; and it is as impos-
sible to exclude the former as it is to deny the latter.
The one-sidedness of the libertarian, who makes freedom
all, is opposed by the one-sidedness of the necessitarian,
who makes automatism all. Even the cla.im that motives are
reasons, not causal and dynamic , cannot be allowed, for
while motives as conceptions are not dynamic, motives as
arising from or expressing impulses, consitut ional or
otherwise, do exercise an influence upon volition and may
even defy our attempts to control them. There are fixed
laws within, as without the agent, and our conquest of the
mental realms like that of the physical realms, depends
upon obedience to the laws which we find, and which we can
neither found nor abrogate.
The plain and unmistakable sense possessed by all of
us of our own moral responsibility, of the immutability of
our own acts to ourselves, is a sense which rests on the
unexpugnable conviction that we are ourselves the authors
of those acts. Its essential connection is not with his
actions, but with his character; and it is in reality,
for his chara.cter, and not for his actions, that his con-
sciousness assures him that he is responsible, and since
it is only from this ingrained sense of responsibility that
we are able to infer the existence of moral liberty at all,
this liberty must reside where re sponsibil i ty resides,--
that is, in a man’s character.
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Man never acts otherwise than as he wills to act, ana
yet at the same time his actions are always necessary. The
reason is that he already is what he wills, and the fact
that his acts, under the influence of given motives or cir
cumstances, follow with absolute necessity from what he is
and wills, merely proves that his actions are the unerring
expression of his individual essence. There is no denial
here of liberty, it is elevated. The will acts with regu-
larity and uniformity. It is determined, in the sense that
it has uniform antecedents. It is free, in the fact that
it is not constrained by anything outside of itself. Free-
dom is not exemption from law. Find becomes moral because
it is held responsible. It is limited on the one hand, by
our physical constitution, and on the other, by the inten-
sity of the impulses and the desires it has to control.
Freedom may choose the seen, it can neither determine nor
escape the harvest. So far from freedom being indetermin-
ism, chance or caprice, these are seen to be incompatible
with it, and freedom proves to be, like finality, the spon-
taneous definiteness of active intelligence . Ana one thing
of the highest importance, which we must not overlook, is
our discovery that no being can be the product of processes
in Nature, and, on the other hand, no one can exert freedom
in an unpredestined world, and that consequently every free
being in relation with such a world must himself precestine
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it, must impart arrangement
,
or form to it, from the form
of his own active intelligence. in fine, a condition for
our making liberty possible in a world ordered by the
reign of natural law is that v;e accept an idealistic phil-
osophy of nature; the laws of nature must issue from, the
free actor himself, and upon a world consisting of states
of consciousness, a world in so far of his own making.
The universe is gradually working out its destiny,
and if "working out" would imply complete freedom then com-
plete freedom would imply determinism. A universe possess-
ing freedom throughout would differ in no wise in its work-
ings from our present universe, except that it would be
completely conscious. Responsibility has been placed on
us in whom the power ana self-consciousness have attained
the highest development of freedom. The central problem
of morality is seen to be, like the central problem of know-
ledge, the nature and function of the self. If a resolution
of the self into its successive states is impossible, if
moral experience presupposes at each stage the presence
and the operation of a permanent self, the case of
freedom is made good. The secret of the power of the
moral ideal is the conviction that it carries with it
that it is no mere ideal, but the expression, more or
less perfect, and always becoming more perfect, of the
supreme Reality that "the rule of right, the symmetries of
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character; the requirements of perfection, are no provincial-
isms of this planet: they are known among the stars, they
reign beyond the Southern Cross, tney are wherever the Universal
Spirit is. This affirmation of the reality of the moral life
must give us in the end a higher view of God, as well as en-
able us to conceive the possibility of a higher union with
Him. The union and communion not only of thought with thought,
but of will with Will."
Here at length, we are aole to unite freedom and deter-
minism in the life of every spirit. It consists in the fact
that both determinism and freedom mean the self-determination
of the conscious being in the light of a two-fold ideal, the
ethical knowledge of a Supreme Ideal, and the knowledge of
himself as a thoroughly individual being, differentiated
from the Supreme Cause, yet related to it, in the great total
of his existence, moving in response to his contemplations of
it, and therefore freely moving. In this union of the actual
and the ideal, we find an explanation of right and wrong. The
question of our effectual freedom in the world of experience
is simply a question whether we have not a living source of
right within us, our own eternal choice. "We cannot anni-
hilate the potential for goodness that lies in our eternal
vision of the supreme Ideal."
Freedom and determinism are only the obverse and the
reverse of the two-faced fact of rational self-development
.
Freedom is the thought-action of the self, defining its identity
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and determinism means nothing hut the definite character
which the rational action involves. This freedom far
from disjoining, and isolating each self from other
selves, in fact, defines the inner life of each, in its
determining whole, in harmony with theirs. Ana in this
real freedom which is inherently rational there is that
determinism, that definiteness, which issues from guid-
ance by the universal rational aim: -- this very deter-
minism gives rise to that ever-recurring Alternative,
that chance, which is so often mistaken for the whole of
freedom, but is only a derivative part of it.
Each spirit other than God fulfils in his own way,
and from its own self-direction, the one universal type
or Ideal. Then each, in doing its own will, that is,
in guiding and defining its own life oy its ideal, does
the ultimate and inclusive will of all the rest; and men
realize the will of God, that is, fulfil the ideal of the
universe, by fulfilling each his own ideal. The demand for
a moral world is the demand for a world of freedom: a world
of persons that think their own thoughts, originate their
own decisions, ana decide rationally,-- yet with judgment, --
that is at once private, yet public . Potency for such
judgment, and the power to make it real under the most
trying conditions, is what moral freedom means. The power
to do, as well as to choose.
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I n a final cause, then, we are to look for the re-
lease from the controversy about the determinism in di-
vine supremacy, and the self-determinism in human or
other non-divine freedom. The reconciliation lies in
realizing that the universe of which we have a kind of
knowledge is but a portion or an aspect of the whole.
We are free, and we are controlled. We are free in so
far as our sensible surroundings, and immediate environ-
ment are concerned: that is, we are free for all prac-
tical purposes, and can choose between alternatives, as
they present themselves. We are controlled, as being
intrinsic parts of an entire Cosmos, suffised with la
w
and order. The more developed and consistent and har-
monious our character becomes, the less liable it is to
random outbreaks, and the more certainly can it be relid
on. We, thus, even now, can exhibit some approximat ion
to the highest etate, that conscious union with the en-
tire scheme of existence, which is identical with per-
fect freedom.
In the last analysis, all scientific views of the
universe end in conceptions that the intellect is
equally unable to grasp. Human knowledge must always
be limited, nevertheless, our limitations should not
afford a reason for doubting that the external universe
exists. If we could see all in its totality, we should
find that everything was definite and ordered and linked
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up with everything else in the chain of causation, and
that nothing was capricious, or uncertain, or uncontrolled.
In believing that freedom and God exist in the cosmic
world, though that world, at first, reveals no direct
trace of them, we are doing no more violence to reason
than when we assert that this cosmic world is real, that
it exists outside ourselves, and that science, within
limits, is its true interpreter. The existence of
nothing in its totality can be grasped by the intellect;
hence the actual working of the process, the nature of
the links, the causes that create our determinations,
are frequently unknown. We still believe, however, that
between our lives and the Supreme cause of the universe
a personal relationship exists, in virtue of which human
affairs are vested with an importance and a meaning imper-
ceptible to the eye of the ordinary observer, that, in
the joint action in the life of every mind directed by
a freedom that recognizes an Ideal, and is self-deter-
mined to realize it, is born the inspiring realization
of a universe ever more freely moving to a higher and
higher harmony with Goa.
<'
I ; f /. t o < 0
>. '
’ r
'
>
,
; i
<
< <
:: .
t
(
;
.ji, 'I > i > c ? •. r- i x .
•
-
<
i
'
.
"
,
'
-
'
.
.
•
, - ,
'
'
•
< ,
. .
'
' *
.
,
'
.
'
r ' . • , ,
< «
'
/
'
•
' 1 ' ~ ... J • ’ '
. :>J 'J :/I .
; r
’
. i . i: ;
,
'i ; ,
1
.
.
•
.
Bibliography .
problem of Theism. Pigou.
Scientific Basis of Morality. Gore.
The Moral Subject as a Genesis of Ethical Elements. E.A. Ross.
Am. J. Soc. vol. 5, pp. 761-77.
The Philosophy of Science. T. S. Barret. pp. 1-213.
The Eield of Ethics. Palmer.
Social and Ethical Interpretations. J. M. Baldwin.
"The Dilemma of Determinism". W. James. pp. 145-83.
System of Ethics. Paulsen. Bk. 2, Chap. 9.
Scientific Basis of Morality. J. Dewey.
Ethical Principles. J. Seth. Part III, pp. 354-460.
Theory of Einal Causes. P. Janet. Entire book.
Theory of Morals. P. Janet. Book 3, pp. 261-400.
Ethical Principles. Bowne
.
Limits of Evolution. G. B. Howison. Part 3.
Reconstruct ion of Religious Eelief. Mallock.
Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion. J. Caird.
The Religious Aspect of Philosophy. J. Royce.
The God of Philosophy. Aveling.
Psychology. B. P. Bowne. Chapter on the Will.
Critique of Practical Reason. Kant. Book 2.
Metaphysics. Rickaby. Chapter on Causality.
Evolution and Ethics. T. H. Huxley.
Theism. B. P. Bowne.
Difference between Efficient and Einal Causes in controlling
human freedom. W.T. Harris. Hat. Educ. Assa. 1902, pp.
342-9.
',v- il.
_
-
-
- •
. j i .. ,
1
.ci-
i
, ,
,
-
'
• t •
' C V
_
»
'
: • •
f _J- . . . . .-on ... . :• . C os: v
1 i
. 11 . cDiriif. 10 bl i
. J j.[, I. . • - • v T . '
.... ..."
.
,
.... .
-
r
v e :-~r ' l"
.
i j. - -I ;• i
,
,
_ V .'r
. t
T‘T j'f ' . . . In i r.n:;JXi-iH
. C riJ Sr. . :7 . . • .1 . -
V. 1
t
... ...
1
w
"
' i!
'
. .* -j< I - ' - I "oiK;. K
I' -n,
r
.
,
'
n ,_/. . -a .'
.
.
•>
,
'
.
jl \ 0 J 1 iC 1*0.: o I'*'
.
'
• o . . A
.
• ... •
.
J n . o. v . n. J.
•
-ii Jv *r ’io
i . .
•
•
1 •
.. .
;
.
;
.
i : tv • o . : .
J
; . i > . . >
.
- i . . • ’•••r
_
Bibliography ( cont inued
)
Free Will and Modern Scientific Conceptions. A. R. Cripps
Westm. 168. pp. 439-45.
Something New in Free Will. G. S. Fullerton. Pop. Sci.
vol. 73, pp. 345-53.
Aspects of Free Will. 77. F. Murphy. Am. Cath. vol. 231,
pp. 292-304.
Will and Destiny. Harper W. 566. F-10. '12.
Determinism versus Free Will. J. E. Stinson. Sci. Am.
pp. 301, 0, ’12.
Choice. C. T. Sadler. Kibbert J. vol. 8, 193-4.
Difficulty of the Problem of Free Will. W. H. Mallock.
Fort. vol. 77, pp. 277-96. F. 1902.
Free Will and Determinism. 0. Lodge. Contemp. vol. 85,
pp. 440-1.
Freedom of Free Will. G. S. Fullerton. Pop. Sci. vol. 58
pp. 183-92.
Origin and Development of the Moral Idea. E. Westermarck.
Review of Nature, vol. 74, pp. 377-8.
Determination versus Free Will. J. J. Ming. Am. Cath. Q,.
vol. 27, pp. 252-75.
Int. J. Ethics. vol. 20, pp. 94-9.
Natural Creation. Plumptre. pp. 1-112.
Iuea of Cause. Francis Bowen. pp. 1-33.
A suggestion as to Causation. Francis Wharton. pp. 1-10.
Of Causes. Grimmel. Monthly Review, 1872, pp. 1-10.
•i. V
-:
'
•
I'i.
.
. .
>
. .
.
r ;
.
-
t . J
CV . J -. r .
.
_
X .
'
. . . j
.
.
.
-I * . - . . " . .or- ' r. .lx":
.
•
. * . .
1
.7 ‘ f - . ;. ' . :>* -\Z
. I
,
'
, 0 . '
.
-
,
. .
~
. .
.
'
•: i r;o.
. 7 • 1 : :J.
«
>'
- c '
'
. o'
:
. r.cv . . . .
.
-0 *7- i
.
. 0 . T'7
.
7
.
M
<
•
.
'
1
.
- V .
.
,
'
.
-
. <
. .
• : i . . . Jill
./: ' f f. r . i - T7
.
’
-
. 9 v.\ : 31 \ ::T . O?:;J30
. OX-X • q -r.j'.
'
.
•.
... r id. aj . .
'
. v
,
1
.7;; i'i:-' . o r: jj
-
iC- -
.
,
r
'
. . V
“

-
